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Guest author:
- DATU ABDELWIN A. SANGKULA, Bangsamoro Professional
COTABATO CITY, January 26, 2026 — The Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) is currently deliberating on several proposed BTA (Bangsamoro Transition Authority) bills to split key ministries, including the Ministry of Basic, Higher and Technical Education (MBHTE) under BTA Bill No. 47, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Agrarian Reform (MAFAR), under BTA Bill No. 102, and the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Energy (MENRE) under BTA Bill No. 48.
Some stakeholders view these proposed splits as counter-productive and a misguided use of legislative energy during the critical transition period. They question the logic of dismantling structures in which the BARMM government has invested hundreds of millions of pesos over the last seven years. Would that significant investment simply be wasted?
From a governance and policy perspective, this is ill-timed, worthless and ineffectual considering the transitional stage of the Bangsamoro.
Furthermore, is splitting these ministries truly the ultimate solution to addressing pervasive issues like corruption, delays and bureaucratic bottlenecks? To explore this, let us particularly examine at the arguments opposing the BTA Parliament Bill (PB) No. 47, also known as the “Bangsamoro Education Reorganization Act of 2022”.
The proposal to separate the MBHTE under PB Bill No. 47 is anchored on a seemingly intuitive claim: that weak education outcomes and administrative difficulties in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) are the consequence of institutional consolidation, and that fragmentation will produce better results. This claim, however, collapses under closer scrutiny. The data cited do not support the proposed remedy, and the logic underpinning the bill misconstrues both the nature of the problem and the realities of post-conflict governance.
At its core, the bill commits a fundamental policy error: it confuses historical and structural deficits with institutional design failure.
1. Poor Outcomes Are Not Evidence of a Failed Structure
The education indicators cited to justify the splitting of MBHTE: low functional literacy, weak cohort survival rates, and poor reading proficiency, are real and deeply concerning. Yet these outcomes are neither new nor unique to the period of MBHTE’s existence. They are the cumulative result of decades of conflict, poverty, school disruption, teacher shortages, and weak infrastructure, all of which predate BARMM and existed under a tri-focalized national education system.
BARMM did not inherit a high-performing education sector that subsequently deteriorated under consolidation. It inherited one of the most historically disadvantaged education systems in the country, already burdened by low baseline indicators. To attribute these entrenched conditions to the structure of MBHTE is analytically unsound. Institutional form cannot reasonably be blamed for outcomes shaped by generational deprivation and systemic under-investment.
International education research is consistent on this point: in fragile and post-conflict settings, learning outcomes correlate most strongly with poverty incidence, conflict exposure, teacher availability, school accessibility, and household stability, not with whether education is governed by one ministry or several agencies. Structural fragmentation does not address these determinants.
2. Demography Demands Integration, Not Disaggregation
The region’s large school-age population is presented as proof that MBHTE is “too large to manage.” In fact, the opposite is true. A young and rapidly growing population demands integrated planning across basic education, technical skills development, and higher education. Learner pathways must be coherent, curricula aligned, and workforce preparation synchronized with regional development goals.
Fragmentation introduces policy silos. It weakens coordination between basic education and skills training, between higher education and labor market needs, and between Madaris (Islamic) education and the mainstream system. In regions with strong institutions, such fragmentation may be manageable. In a region still consolidating its governance capacity, it is a liability.
3. Administrative Bottlenecks Are Transitional, Not Structural
The justification of the bill cites delayed salaries, procurement backlogs, and hiring constraints as evidence that MBHTE is unmanageable. Yet these challenges are not unique to MBHTE. They are common across BARMM ministries and are widely recognized as transition-phase governance issues: evolving fiscal systems, staffing gaps, procurement learning curves, and audit compliance requirements.
There is no credible evidence that splitting MBHTE would resolve these problems. On the contrary, separation would multiply payroll systems, procurement units, accounting offices, and compliance risks. Each new agency would require its own administrative backbone, increasing overhead while diverting attention from service delivery. In the short to medium term, fragmentation would almost certainly worsen delays rather than cure them.
4. Budget Size Is Not a Governance Defect
The argument that MBHTE’s budget share proves it is too large misunderstands public finance realities. Education is the largest expenditure sector in nearly all governments worldwide because it is labor-intensive. Teacher salaries alone account for the bulk of spending. A large education budget reflects demographic demand and constitutional prioritization, not inefficiency.
If budget magnitude were a valid justification for institutional breakup, national education ministries worldwide would be perpetually reorganized. They are not because size, by itself, is not a proxy for poor governance.
5. The National Trifocal Model Is a Weak Benchmark
Invoking the national DepEd-CHED-TESDA arrangement as a model for BARMM ignores two critical facts. First, that system evolved over decades in a stable political environment. Second, it remains widely criticized for policy incoherence, skills mismatch, and weak school-to- work transitions.
Autonomy exists precisely to allow BARMM to design institutions suited to its context, not to replicate national arrangements whose limitations are well documented. Importing structural fragmentation from the center is not reform; it is imitation without analysis.
6. Madaris Education Is Best Protected Through Integration
The proposed separation of Madaris education into a distinct office risks marginalization rather than empowerment. Madaris education thrives when it is mainstreamed, when its teachers are trained within the broader system, its curriculum aligned with national standards, and its learners given seamless access to further education and employment.
Isolation weakens influence, fragments funding, and undermines integration. A unified ministry offers Madaris education greater institutional protection, not less.
7. The Question of Timing: An Institutional Disservice
Beyond substance, the timing of BTA Bill No. 47 raises serious governance concerns. BARMM is on the threshold of a historic transition: the conduct of its first parliamentary elections and the assumption of office by the first regular Bangsamoro Parliament. At this critical juncture, institutional stability is a democratic obligation.
To impose a sweeping reorganization of the education sector at this moment is to hand the incoming Parliament a half-built, unsettled, and fragmented system still grappling with transition costs, staffing realignments, regulatory uncertainty, and operational disruption. Instead of inheriting a coherent ministry capable of policy refinement and legislative oversight, the first Parliament would be burdened with managing the fallout of an unfinished administrative experiment.
This is a disservice not only to the incoming lawmakers but, more importantly, to the Bangsamoro people. Education reform requires continuity, predictability, and time. Fragmentation on the eve of parliamentary transition undermines all three. It delays accountability, obscures performance baselines, and postpones the very reforms the bill claims to advance.
Institution-building is a cumulative process. It must respect political timing, democratic succession, and institutional readiness. To do otherwise is to substitute haste for prudence and disruption for reform.
8. Contrary to the Mandate of Republic Act No. 11054
More fundamentally, the proposed separation runs counter to the clear intent and mandate of Republic Act No. 11054, the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). The law explicitly envisions and authorizes the establishment of an integrated system of education in the Bangsamoro, precisely to address historical fragmentation, policy incoherence, and unequal access that characterized the pre-BARMM period. The creation of MBHTE as a unified ministry was not an administrative accident but a deliberate legal and policy choice, recognizing that basic education, higher education, technical-vocational training, and Madaris education are interlinked components of a single human capital pipeline. To dismantle this integrated framework through ordinary legislation is to reverse, rather than operationalize, the organic law’s mandate. Such a move weakens the autonomy-enhancing rationale of RA No. 11054 and undermines the very institutional innovation that distinguishes BARMM from the national system it was designed to improve upon.
9. Conclusion
There is no credible empirical basis to conclude that separating MBHTE will improve education outcomes in BARMM. The data cited do not demonstrate causation, the logic misidentifies the problem, and the proposed solution introduces new risks without addressing root causes.
The challenge before BARMM is not institutional excess but institutional maturity. What is required is strengthening internal systems, deepening professional capacity, improving coordination, and allowing reforms to take root. Fragmentation will not deliver these outcomes.
Education reform demands patience, coherence, and continuity. MBHTE should be strengthened, not dismantled. (/)
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Every word in this piece is solely the author’s and not necessarily of or by SDN.